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Despite considerable research suggesting that creators value attribution that is, being named as the creator of a work- U.S. intellectual property (JP)
law does not provide a right to attribution to the vast majority of creators. On
the other side of the Atlantic, however, many European · countries give
creators, at least in their copyright laws, much stronger rights to attribution.
At first blush it may seem that the U.S. has gotten it wrong, and the Europeans
have made a better policy choice in providing to creators a right that they
value. But for reasons we will explain in this Article, matters are much more
complicated.
This Article reports a series of experiments that are the first to attempt to
measure quantitatively the value of attribution to creators. In previous
research, we have shown that creators of IP are subject to a "creativity effect "
that results in their assigning substantially higher value to their works than
neoclassical economic theory predicts. The first two experiments reported in
this Article suggest a way that the creativity effect may be reduced: creators
are willing to sacrifice significant economic payments in favor of receiving
attribution for their work. The value to creators of attribution raises the
question whether U.S. IP law should be restructured to provide attribution as a
creator 's default right.
The third and most important experiment reported here casts doubt on the
value of giving creators such a default right, because creators value
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attribution differently depending on whether the legal rule gives it to them as
an initial entitlement or not. When creators are given a right to attribution as a
default, they value credit four times higher than when attribution is not the
default option. Our findings make clear that creators value attribution, and
that the prospect of obtaining it can lead to a more efficient level of
transacting. At the same time, paradoxically, our findings suggest that we
should exercise caution before we restructure U.S. law, which provides no
right to attribution for the vast majority of creators. Indeed, it is possible,
under conditions that we will describe, that providing creators with a default
right to attribution will result in less efficient transacting.
Finally, our findings have implications for property theory which are
broader than IP law or attribution rights. Our third experiment suggests that a
party who enjoys a default legal right as part of her initial complement of
rights will tend to treat that legal right in a fashion similar to any other form of
initial entitlement, and overvalue it relative to what neoclassical theory would
predict. This suggests a principle regarding how to efficiently structure default
rules in any setting. All other factors being equal, an efficiently structured
default rule will locate the initial legal entitlement in the party who is either
less likely to overvalue the entitlement, or, if overvaluation seems inevitable
regardless of where the initial entitlement is placed, is likely to overvalue it
less.
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a young and as yet unknown author. You have been
contacted by a publishing company that wants you to assist a famous politician
in writing her memoirs. The company gives you a choice between two
contracts: the first will pay you $25,000 but your name will not appear
anywhere on the book, while the second will pay you $10,000 but your name
will appear as a second author on the book's cover and title page. If you are
like most people, you are certainly attracted to the extra cash. But credit is
probably also worth something to you as well. You may value being named as
an author because you feel it is morally right that you get credit, or because it
will enhance your reputation and social standing, or because it could help you
receive other, more lucrative writing contracts in the future. Would you be
willing to take the smaller payment in exchange for having your name on the
book?
Intuition and experience indicate that authors value having their name
associated with their wo.rk. In addition, a growing body of research, including
studies by the authors of this Article, finds that, in many fields of creative
endeavor, people value receiving attribution for the work they have done.1 But
l See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: How
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 178-79, 185-88 (2012) (describing how chefs, open source
software programmers, and other creators value attribution); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On
the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se
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aside from this general sense of attribution's value, neither our intuitions nor
existing research provide specific guidance as to the value of attribution. For
example, how much is attribution actually worth to the average author? And do
authors' assessments of the value of attribution shift depending on whether the
law provides them with a default right to it? That is, do authors' valuations of
attribution differ between instances where the author possesses the right as an
initial entitlement and is considering whether to trade it away, and instances
where the author starts with no default right to attribution and is considering
trading off money to get it?
There is almost certainly data in the hands of publishers, software firms,
movie studios, and record companies that might help answer these questions,
but there is at present little prospect that it will be made available to
researchers. Rather than wait, we set out to create our own data, via
experiments designed to simulate intellectual property (IP) transactions. This
Article reports the results of three experiments designed to test the value of
attribution and to determine if that value varies depending on whether the
author starts with a default right to attribution or not.
These questions are of significant contemporary importance. In earlier work
we experimentally studied the ways in which creators assign monetary value to
the things they create. 2 That research suggested that creators are subject to a
systematic bias that leads them to overvalue their work. This bias, which we
have called the "creativity effect," potentially results in inefficient markets in
IP because creators may be unwilling to license their works for rational
amounts. 3 But if creators value opportunities for publication and attribution,
they should be willing to trade off monetary compensation for those
opportunities - and that willingness to reach a deal for less money might
mitigate, or perhaps even eliminate, the creativity effect.
In the first two experiments we conducted and report in this Article, we
created a protocol that allows authors to make a tradeoff between monetary
compensation on the one hand and publication and attribution on the other. The
results offer new insight into the value of attribution, and they confirm that the
prospect of attribution does affect how creators value their work. Attribution is
not, however, a panacea for the inefficiencies generated by the creativity
Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1151-54 (2007) (describing social
nonns governing attribution among American chefs); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von
Hippe!, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG.
Ser. 187, 191-94 (2008) (describing nonns governing attribution among French chefs);
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It 's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO.
L.J. 49, 76-101 (2006) (describing attribution nonns across various fields).
2 Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. Cm.
L. REV. 31 , 31-32 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect] ;
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigrnan, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. l, 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Valuing JP].
3 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 32.
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effect: as we shall describe, subjects offered the prospect of attribution still
tend to overvalue their works, albeit to a lesser degree than the overvaluation
observed when the prospect of attribution is not present.
Empirically confirming the intuition that authors value attribution and
getting some sense of the size of that value are important steps toward
improving our currently poor understanding of how markets in creative goods
actually work. The findings of our first two experiments suggest that the
prospect of attribution is a useful countervailing force that reduces the
creativity effect and thereby improves the efficiency of markets in creative
works.
These findings do not, however, automatically signal that U.S. IP law, and
especially U.S. copyright law, should incorporate a general creators' right to
attribution. 4 At present, IP law in the U.S. accords only very limited protection
to a creator's interest in attribution. 5 Instead, the law focuses on protecting an
author or inventor's ability to obtain financial compensation for the sale or use
of her work. 6 To the extent that she desires recognition of her contribution to a
work or product, she will typically have to bargain for it separately.
Many scholars have called for the U.S. to adopt a default attribution right
similar to those in Europe.7 But is such a rule efficient? Would U.S. IP law
function better if it provided creators with a default (that is, waivable)
attribution right?
To gain a better understanding of that policy question, we conducted a third
experiment testing the economic effects of assigning creators default waivable
attribution rights. The results of this experiment confirm research in the
behavioral sciences that shows default rules can be very "sticky": people are
often reluctant to adjust away from the status quo default. Our data indicate
that when attribution is provided in creators' default endowment they value it
approximately four times as much as they do when credit is not provided
initially. This suggests that, all else being equal, if creators are given default
attribution rights, transactions over attribution would tend to face higher costs
inhering in creators' tendency to overvalue that initial default right.
Transactions under this default rule would therefore occur less frequently than
when the default does not provide an attribution right.
4

U.S. copyright law already recognizes a narrow right to attribution for the authors of a
small category of very valuable works of fine art. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992-93 (2006) (describing the limitations in the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A, that render the Act
inapplicable to the majority of creative works); infra notes 25-26. U.S. patent law also
requires that the actual inventor be named on the patent application, but nothing in patent
law gives the inventor any right to have his or her name associated with the invention as it is
actually made, sold, and used in the marketplace. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-115 (2006).
5 See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
6
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (describing the exclusive rights of copyright owners).
7 See infra note 31.
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The takeaway of this observation for the law is not entirely straightforward.
In a world of significant transaction costs, the Coase Theorem advises
policymakers to avoid as many costly transactions as possible by granting
initial entitlements to those likely to value them the most. 8 In many cases the
Coasean formula is likely to produce efficient outcomes. Our findings suggest,
however, that this relatively simple formula can in some instances lead to
inefficient allocations. If transaction costs created by overvaluation of a default
right to attribution - what we can refer to as "behavioral transaction costs" or
"bias costs" - outweigh the ordinary transaction costs recognized by the
neoclassical model, it may be best to keep U.S. law as it is. In such instances,
our results suggest that adding a default right to attribution to U.S. IP law
would more likely worsen, rather than reduce, inefficiencies in IP licensing
markets.
Part I describes our previous research on IP valuation and the questions that
motivated the current research. It discusses earlier work by others on
attribution and explains our premises for this new research. Part II reports on
the methods and results of the three experiments we designed to test the value
that photographers assign to publication and attribution and to assess the
effects of a default attribution right. Part III explores the implications of our
findings for the law.
I.

A.

ATTRIBUTION, PUBLICATION, AND THE VALUE OF IP

Valuing IP
l.

Background

For decades, IP law has rested on a series of assumptions about how the
creators of IP should behave. Under these assumptions, derived from ideas in
neoclassical economics, IP creators, like everyone else in the world, behave as
rational value maximizers. That is, on the whole and over time, creators make
rational, wealth-maximizing decisions with respect to valuing, licensing, and
selling their IP.9 In recent years, however, the assumption that people's
decisions conform to the neoclassical model has been substantially undermined
by empirical studies in behavioral economics. Most importantly, many studies
have shown that when it comes to assigning value to things they own, people
are subject to a cognitive bias, known as the "endowment effect," that results

8

See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. l, 19 (1960) ("Even when
it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is
obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the
employment of resources in carrying them out."); see also RlCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW l 0, 63-67 (8th ed. 2011 ).
9
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RlCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71-84 (2003).
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in considerable overvaluation of the owned goods. 10 Accordingly, the amount
of money people are willing to accept (WTA) to part with goods they own is
typically significantly higher than the amount of money that similarly situated
people are willing to pay (WTP) to purchase those same goods.
In our earlier work, we inquired whether these same findings would apply to
IP. 11 Unlike land and ordinary personal property, IP is nonrival, that is, its
consumption by one person does not prevent another person from consuming
it. 12 And because IP is nonrival, transactions involving this form of property
are fundamentally different from those studied in the existing endowmenteffect experiments, which have modeled transactions over tangible property
like coffee mugs, candy bars, and basketball tickets. 13 When parties transact

10
See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 127-38 (2008) (describing the endowment
effect as a "peculiarity" of ownership that often affects owners' ability to deal rationally);
Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone: How Value Can Appear So Different
to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360, 368-69 (2000) (exploring possible
explanations for the endowment effect); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the
Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 238-47 (1991) (exploring the impact of the
endowment effect in various legal contexts); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard
H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325, 1329-36 (1990) (finding the existence of an endowment effect when subjects
were given coffee mugs and offered their cash equivalent); Russell Korobkin, The
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (providing
background on the endowment effect and analyzing its impact on legal analysis); Richard
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47
( 1980) (labeling the common tendency to refuse to give up entitlements even when that
entitlement would not have been purchased initially as the "endowment effect").
11
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 31-36; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 2-5. In a recent paper, Gregory Klass and Kathryn
Zeiler argue that some new experimental findings have undermined the previous work
establishing the endowment effect, or at least undermined the model of an endowment effect
based on loss aversion. Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory:
Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship 3-5 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 13-013, Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 13-005, 2013), available at htt
p://ssm.com/abstract=2224105. Klass and Zeiler criticize some methodological features of
the earlier endowment-effect studies; we have attempted to incorporate those criticisms many of which appeared in earlier works, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REv.
530 (2005) - into our own experimental designs. Klass and Zeiler also caution against using
the term "endowment effect" to explain the WTA-WTP gap that arises in many situations.
We appreciate their critique but continue to use the term because it is widely accepted in the
behavioral science literature.
12
This is a fact that the record companies have recently learned to their detriment, as
consumers duplicate music files and share them, at virtually zero cost to themselves, with
friends and strangers alike.
13
See supra note IO.
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over IP, the seller usually does not give up the tangible property itself but only
the intangible right to earn money through it; thus, unlike in cases of tangible
property, alienation is typically incomplete.14 In light of IP's nonrivalrousness
and the incomplete alienation that typically characterizes transactions in IP, we
thought it possible that the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment
effect would be mitigated, or perhaps even absent, from IP transactions. Why?
Because the personal attachment to property or anticipated regret following its
alienation that leads owners in endowment-effect experiments to overvalue
their property may not operate where the transaction does not involve the
owner's complete loss of the property.1 5
Yet, unlike any experiment in the existing literature, the property we
planned to study was not simply that with which owners had been "endowed,"
but instead property that subjects had actually created themselves. We
suspected that subjects would feel significantly greater personal attachment to
property they had created compared to property they had been given.
Consequently, we arrived at a second hypothesis in direct opposition to our
first: the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect would be
even more pronounced for owners of the property if they had actually created
it.
In a series of experiments involving the creation of poems and paintings, we
confirmed the second hypothesis and provided evidence for the existence of a
"creativity effect" - the tendency of creators of goods to assign higher value to
their works not only compared to would-be purchasers of the goods, but
relative also to mere owners (that is, subjects who had not created but merely
been given the works, as in previous studies).16 This was a significant finding,
because it suggests that there is something distinctive about the act of

14
See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing JP, supra note 2, at 4. Note that in certain types
of IP transactions, alienation is as "complete" as in transactions involving tangible property
- for example where the IP transaction involves sale of an article like an oil painting or a
sculpture that has only been produced in a single copy. Of course, for most IP transactions,
such as those involving novels, plays, songs, films, poems, photographs, computer software,
or prints, the work at issue may freely be copied, and therefore alienation is incomplete in
that it does not entirely deprive the seller of access to the work.
15
Research even suggests that owning multiple, non-complementary units of the same
good reduces the endowment effect for individuals, bolstering the case for nonrival IP to
operate differently than more traditional market goods. See Katherine Burson, David Faro &
Yuval Rottenstreich, Multiple-Unit Holdings Yield Attenuated Endowment Effects, 59
MGMT. SCI. 545,546 (2013).
16
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 38-40; see also Nikolaus
Franke et al., The "/ Designed It Myself" Effect in Mass Customization, 56 MGMT. Sci. 125,
136-37 (2010) (reporting that subjects value self-designed products higher than non-selfdesigned products); Michael I. Norton et al., The "Ikea Effect": When Labor Leads to Love
2-3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 11-091, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
research/pdf/11-091.pdf (finding that investing labor in a project increases people's
valuation of the results).
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creativity that tends to magnify the valuation anomalies associated with the
endowment effect. The creativity effect drives creators' WTA even further
away from buyers' WTP, and in doing so it makes deals over creative goods
more difficult to reach.
2.

Design of Prior Experiments

Our earlier studies were designed to model the nature of IP markets, where
the goods sold are not the underlying works themselves but simply the
opportunity to seek rents through ownership of the rights. To do so, we
established contests for creative works. In one such experiment, we solicited
paintings for a contest that would be judged by an expert with the winning
painting receiving a $100 prize. 17 The painters (Painters) of the works were
told that they would be competing with nine other paintings for the prize. They
were then told that their painting would be shown to another subject who had
been recruited for the study. That subject (Buyer) would make Painter a cash
offer for Painter's right to win the prize money if her painting was selected as
the winner. Painters were asked to indicate their WTA to sell their painting's
chance to win the prize. Each Buyer was then shown one Painter's painting
and told to indicate their WTP to purchase that Painter's chance to win the
prize. Finally, a group of subjects was recruited for the study to play the role of
owners (Owners). They were told that there would be a contest with a $100
prize and that, for purposes of the contest, they owned one of the paintings'
chances to win the prize. They were then asked to indicate the least amount of
money they would be willing to accept to sell their chance to win the prize. In
no case would the ownership of the actual painting change hands; the parties
were only transacting over the chance to win the prize.
3.

Prior Results

Our data suggested a large gap between the WTA of Owners of IP-style
rights and the WTP of Buyers, consistent with previous research on the
endowment effect. Furthermore, the data showed a large and significant gap
between Painters' WTA and Owners' WTA. Thus, Painters' mean WT A was
$74.59, Owners' mean WTA was $40.67, and Buyers' mean WTP was $17.39.
Differences between each condition were significant at the p = 0.05 level. 18
These results suggested the existence of a creativity effect - a pricing anomaly
that, unlike the endowment effect, is linked not merely to the ownership of
property, but to the creation of property. The creativity effect explains why
Painters demanded significantly more than Owners to transfer the chance of
winning the prize. Authorship, our study suggests, produces a tendency to
value creativity more highly than does mere ownership.
These findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, they suggest
that creators of IP place significantly higher value on their works than the
17

18

Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 37-38.
Id. at 40 & n.35.
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neoclassical model predicts. Given the zero-sum nature of the contest, the
mean WTA of Painters should have been around $10 (reflecting a one in ten
chance of winning a $100 prize if randomly selected). Interestingly, much of
the observed overvaluation appeared to have come from Painters' substantial
overoptimism in the probability that their work would win the prize. On
average, they predicted that their paintings would have a 52.8% chance of
winning. 19 Additionally, we found some evidence that Painters' regret aversion
(their anticipated anxiety about having sold the winning painting) could have
led to their higher valuations, but that evidence was merely suggestive.20
Second, and most importantly, our findings suggested that IP markets may
be significantly less efficient than neoclassical law and economics accounts
have previously supposed. These accounts propose that initial distributions of
property will have little effect on ultimate distributions, at least in a world
without transaction costs, because property will flow to its highest-valued
use. 21 On the contrary, our findings indicate that initial distributions of IP may
be sticky. The original owner of IP, very often its creator, will tend to
systematically overvalue it compared to potential purchasers, resulting in a
suboptimal number of wealth-maximizing transactions. In many instances, we
believe, the creators of IP will refuse to sell or license their works or inventions
even when doing so would be beneficial to both parties. Accordingly, in our
previous publications, we offered potential remedies to bargaining impasses,
including the wider use of liability rules across both copyright and patent, as
well as changes to the copyright rules regarding formalities, works made for
hire, and fair use. 22
B.

New Experiments: The Value ofAttribution and Publication

Our previous research focused exclusively on the monetary value that the
creators of IP assign to their works. As a considerable literature suggests,
however, creators often seem to care about more than just the amount of
money that they can earn through their work. Wikipedia authors and opensource computer programmers write without compensation, but they enforce
norms about attribution and credit.23 Stand-up comics and chefs work in fields

19
Id. For Owners and Buyers the predicted probabilities were 41.9% and 31.8%,
respectively. Id. The differences between these probabilities were all statistically significant
at the p = 0.05 level.
20
Id. at 42-43.
21 See Coase, supra note 8, at 10; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur
Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 633, 646-47 (2009); Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 855-61 (Laurence E. Blume & Steven N.
Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2008).
22
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 44-52; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 42-43.
23 See Fisk, supra note l, at 88-92 (describing the norms governing attribution among
programmers of open source software); Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship. Social Media, and

2013)

WHAT'S A NAME WORTH?

1399

without strong IP protection, but they often insist upon receiving credit for
their innovations. 24 These and other creators have a host of motivations that
involve the desire to spread their ideas and the reputational value of being
thought a successful artist or inventor in addition (or related) to monetary
compensation.
Despite the importance that creators apparently attach to attribution, U.S. IP
law accords it very little recognition. Attribution is not one of the exclusive
rights that U.S. copyright law gives to authors, except for a narrow provision,
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), conferring attribution rights on a small
number of authors of valuable works of fine art. 25 But VARA is inapplicable to
the vast majority of creative works, even ones that trade for significant sums. 26
For example, if a movie producer licenses a song to be included in a film,
copyright law creates no formal requirement that the song's author be credited
for it. And aside from the narrow protection offered by VARA, if authors
subject to U.S. copyright law wish to gain attribution rights, they must
negotiate separately for them. 27

the Curatorial Audience, l HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95, 100-02 (2010) (describing the
norms governing attribution among authors ofWikipedia articles).
24
See Buccafusco, supra note I, at ll51-54 (describing the norms governing attribution
among chefs); Fauchart & von Hippe!, supra note l, at 191-94 (describing norms governing
attribution among French chefs); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There 's No Free
Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation
of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1809-31 (2008) (describing the norms
governing attribution among stand-up comics). For additional discussion of these issues, see
RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note l, at 178-79, 185-88 (describing how chefs, open
source software programmers, and other creators value attribution).
25
See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 7-10 (1990) (describing the relationship of VARA to
the Berne Convention). VARA gives the creators of certain categories of visual art a
waivable right of attribution when those works are produced only in single works or in
limited editions. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
26
See 17 U.S.C. § l06A(b) (limiting the scope of VARA to works of visual art).
27
For many years, American authors used trademark law to protect their right to be
named as the author of their works. They claimed that the failure to include their names on
their works amounted to illegal "passing off' of the goods as coming from another source.
See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1200
(2005) (pointing out the "common belief that designations of authorship, like trademarks,
could be determined to be true or false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient
qualities of goods, and that protection under trademark law was thus required"). This
practice came to an end, however, with the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Dastar Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which effectively terminated the
use of trademark as a tool for obtaining attribution. The Dastar Court held that trademark
law is prohibited from extending "passing off' protection to the sorts of "communicative
products" that are regulated by copyright law. Id. at 28-33; see also Christopher Sprigman,
Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 565, 56568 (2007) (suggesting that the result in Dastar represents the Supreme Court's tacit
enforcement of limits on Congress's legislative authority under the Patent and Copyright

1400

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1389

U.S. copyright law's scant concern for attribution is mirrored, for the most
part, in U.S. patent law. U.S. law has long required that the inventor or
inventors be named on the patent even if the invention was developed and
motivated by the inventor's corporate employer. 28 The law has never required,
however, that the inventor be given any form of credit for the invention as it is
actually made, marketed, and used. 29
The treatment of attribution, at least with respect to copyright, is different
abroad. Compared with U.S. copyright law, authorial rights to attribution
figure much more prominently in the copyright law of many of our principal
trading partners. Most European countries extend to creators certain kinds of
attribution rights, 30 and recently a number of American scholars have called for
the U.S. to recognize some form of attribution right in its copyright law. 31

Clause).
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to
be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided ....").
29 See id. §§ 111-115.
30 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROPR. INTELL.] art. L. 121-L
(Fr.), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/fr/fr062en.pdf
(providing that "[a]n author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship, and
his work," and that "[t]his right shall attach to his person"); Gesetz uber Urheberrecht und
verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965,
BGBL. I at 1273, §§ 13, 14 (Ger.), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.d
e/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html#p0056 (providing that the author "has the right to be
identified as the author of the work," may "determine whether the work shall bear a
designation of authorship and which designation is to be used," and "has the right to prohibit
the distortion or any other derogatory treatment of his work which is capable of prejudicing
his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the work"); Legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633,
in G.U. July 16, 1941, n. 166, art. 20 (It.), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo
lex/en/text.jsp?file_id=l~8286 (providing that "the author shall retain the right to claim
authorship of his work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or any other modification
of, and other derogatory action in relation to, the work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation").
31 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 111 (proposing that "a right of attribution be regarded as an
implied term of every employment agreement"); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1798 (2012); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to
Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 Hous. L. REV. 263, 266
(2004) (proposing "an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to add a federal right of
attribution of authorship"); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of Authomym: Authorship,
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1445-49 (2005)
(advocating recognition of a form of attribution rights); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and
Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REv. 985, 988 (2002) ("[T]he adoption of an express right of
attribution is the only approach capable of fully protecting the authorial interests that
currently are insufficiently addressed under our legal system."); Greg Lastowka, Digital
Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REv. 41 , 84-85 (2007) (proposing
that the fair use provisions in U.S. copyright law incorporate "the provision of attribution").
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Although there is substantial qualitative evidence that creators value
attribution, there has, however, been no attempt to measure that value. Our
experimental framework from the previous studies offered an attractive
platform that could be adapted to explore the relationship between creators'
interest in reputation and publication, on the one hand, and in monetary
compensation, on the other.
1.

Attribution in Law and Practice

Attribution - the label we use when we assign credit to a person's role in the
production of a creative work - can have individual and social value for a
number of reasons. 32 Attribution may be valuable to the individual producer of
the work, for example, because receiving credit may help her obtain further
employment in the field or sell more works in the future. We can think of this
as attribution's extrinsic value. Separately, an individual may value attribution,
because seeing her name attached to her work produces a positive psychic or
emotional effect on her wellbeing. 33 We can call this attribution's intrinsic
value. Finally, attribution may have some individual moral or ethical value to
the producer of the work as a legal and social recognition of her relationship to
the work. 34 We can call this attribution's moral value.35
Apart from its individual value, assigning attribution to creators may have
social value. Connecting a creator with her work can aid consumers in making
decisions about which products to buy,36 and it can assist industries and
individuals in assigning credit and blame to the successes and failures of
products. 37 Throughout this Article, however, we are directly concerned with
the ways in which attribution confers individual value.
The laws of most other countries, including many of our chief trading
partners, give legal recognition to authors' interests in attribution, 38 but they
32
For detailed treatments of the values associated with attribution, see Fisk, supra note 1,
at 53-67, and Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1175-85.
33
See ERIC s. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 64 (1999) ("The 'utility
function ' Linux hackers are maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible
reward of their own ego satisfaction and reputation among other hackers."); Fisk, supra note
I, at 50 ("Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation and intrinsically
valuable simply for the pleasure of being acknowledged.").
34
See Kwall, supra note 31, at 986.
35
We do not intend to suggest that these different values are mutually exclusive. They
almost certainly are not.
36
See Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 65
(2007); Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1179 ("Authorial attribution furthers the interests of
consumers by reducing the costs of searching for creative content.").
37
Fisk, supra note I, at 61 ("[T]here are circumstances in which people think it
important to plan for failure and to design attribution regimes whose purpose is to allocate
blame.").
38
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is the primary
reference for what are referred to in international law as the "moral rights" of creators.
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have diverged on the precise content of the right. The United Kingdom
provides authors of certain copyrightable works with a waivable right to be
named as the author of their works in a clear and reasonably prominent
manner. 39 Other countries, however, have established nonwaivable attribution
rights. Most notably, France and Italy have statutorily granted authors a
perpetual, inalienable right to attribution. 40 In addition, some countries (again,
most notably, France) have granted some artists a droit de suite - that is, a
right to royalties on the resale ofworks. 41
Despite evidence that creators value attribution, as well as pressure from
international treaty obligations, the U.S. has been reluctant to recognize strong
forms of attribution rights, or indeed any other form of moral right. The
paucity of formal IP protection for attribution rights in the U.S. does not,
however, mean that creators are unable to obtain credit for their efforts; it
simply means that creators must use the property rights that U.S. IP law gives
them as leverage to negotiate for attribution. Instead of being a subject of IP
law, attribution in the U.S. becomes a subject of contract law and the operation
of social norms that either favor or disfavor attribution within specific creative
communities and industries.
In many creative fields, attribution is a matter of bargaining between initial
creators and subsequent producers of content.42 As in the example used at the
beginning of this Article, the author desiring her name on the cover of the book
may insist on the inclusion of a contract provision providing for credit as part
of the bargain she strikes with the publisher, and it may affect the price she
gets paid for her work. Relatedly, creators in some fields, especially those

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9, 1886,
last amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1989), 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Since 1928 the Berne Convention has codified moral rights
of attribution (the author's right to have his name associated with his work) and integrity
(the author's right to prevent mutilation or revision of his work). Berne Convention art.
6bis(l ); see also Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors ' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STIJD. 95, 97 (1997); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?,
38 VAND. L. REv. 1, 10 & n.38 (1985). In conformance with the Berne Convention, many
countries have included rights of attribution in their IP laws. See supra note 30.
39
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77-78 (U.K.); see also LIONEL
BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 244-49 (3d ed. 2009).
4
C. PROPR. INTELL. art. L. 121-1 (Fr.) (stating that the right to attribution is "perpetual,
inalienable, and imprescriptible"); Legge 22 aprile 1941 , n. 633, in G.U. July 16, 1941, n.
166, art. 22-23 (It.) (declaring both that the right is inalienable and that it " may be asserted,
without limitation of time" by the creator's descendants and their descendants).
41
See, e.g. , C. PROPR. INTELL. art. L. 122-8 (Fr.) (providing that " [a]uthors of graphic and
three-dimensional works ... have an inalienable right ... to participate in the proceeds of
any sale of such work").
42
See Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1174 ("[A)uthors may use copyright as a lever to
demand attributions of authorship.").

°
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involving computers and the Internet, often attach licenses to the use of their
work that require attribution. 43 Many of these licenses are established by the
Creative Commons organization.44 Approximately ninety-eight percent of the
people who choose Creative Commons licenses demand attribution; therefore,
since 2004 Creative Commons has not offered a license that does not include
an attribution requirement. 45
. In many industries, attribution practices are the subject of complex
bargaining between parties. 46 In the movie industry, for example, who gets
credit and how one receives it - including the order, font, and size of their
names - are determined by contracts negotiated between the movie studios and
the guilds representing the various members of the industry. 47 In some fields,
attribution is governed by more or less formalized norms. Attribution practices
for scientific research have been proposed by the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors. 48 The guidelines specify who should be named as a
paper's author and in what order. 49 In other creative fields, norms governing
attribution are less established. In graphic design and elite cuisine, for
example, there appears to be little attempt to formalize norms regarding
attribution. 50
The apparent value that creators attach to attribution has led to calls from a
variety of scholars for the U.S. to enhance legal protection for attribution and
credit. Interestingly, as Rebecca Tushnet observes, proponents of strengthened
attribution laws come from both "high protectionist" and "low protectionist"
camps. 51 On the one hand, high protectionists favor attribution rights as part of
a broader mission of enhancing authors' opportunities for complete economic
and moral control of their works.52 On the other hand, low protectionists
support attribution as a way of giving authors something they value while
simultaneously pursuing a wider agenda of shrinking the scope of IP rules and
expanding the range of uncontrolled and uncompensated uses outside the reach
of IP Iaw. 53 Although the proposals for enhancing attribution rights diverge in
many ways, support for legal recognition of some sort of right to attribution
appears to be increasing. Despite this interest, there has been little previous
43

Lastowka, supra note 31, at 59.
See id. at 78-81.
45 Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0 Licenses,
COMMONS (May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
46 See Fisk, supra note l , at 77-101.
47 Id. at 76-81.
48
Id. at 83-84.
49 Id.
44

CREATIVE

° Fauchart & von Hippe!, supra note l , at 192-94; Fisk, supra note l, at 86-87.

5

51

Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 792-

93 .
52
53

Id. at 793 .
Id. at 792-93 .
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study of the quantitative value of such a right, or whether installing such a right
as the default rule in copyright or patent law would tend in general to ease or
impede bargaining over rights to copy, distribute, and use creative works.
2.

Modeling the Value of Attribution and Publication

If creators value opportunities for attribution and publication, then they
should be willing to trade off some monetary return on their works in favor of
those opportunities. It is possible, furthermore, that they value publication and
attribution so much that the WT A-WTP gap that we have seen in our previous
studies - that is, the creativity effect - disappears. Thus, if the composer of a
musical work places so much value merely on the opportunity to have her song
heard or to improve her reputation as a composer, she might not insist on very
much money at all to transfer her IP rights in the song to someone who would
like to include it in a Hollywood movie. As Greg Lastowka has suggested,
open-source computer coding can be thought of in this way.54 Open-source
coders allow their work to be freely distributed to the public, but most opensource licenses have clauses requiring that users provide attribution to the
code's creators. Although their coding potentially has positive economic value,
coders set the price of access at the point where it maximizes reputational
gains, that is, at $0. 55 The same can be said of those who use Creative
Commons licenses that require attribution or of those who voluntarily write
and edit Wikipedia entries. 56
If this kind of attribution-based price discounting occurs often, IP markets
may in fact be more efficient than we had given them credit for in our earlier
work. Because creators are typically not given attribution rights by U.S. IP
law, they will have to bargain for them. Presumably, this desire will drive
down the price of licensing their works relative to licenses that do not provide
for attribution and will shrink the gap between creators' WTA and buyers'
WTP, resulting in more efficient transacting. Similarly, if creators value the
prospect of publication even without their name attached, then we should see
an analogous publication-based price discounting. But whether we will in fact
see this is unclear. It is possible that some creators will resist the idea of having
their work published without attribution. They might believe that it is
inappropriate or immoral for the work to be published without an indication of
its creator. 57 Accordingly, such creators would be less attracted to publication
without attribution than they would be to monetary compensation standing
alone. Both of these possibilities receive at least anecdotal support. 58
54
55
56

Lastowka, supra note 31, at 59.
Id.

See Garon, supra note 23, at 107-08.
The attractiveness of attribution requirements in Creative Commons licenses suggests
as much. Cf id. at 108.
58 Compare, e.g., Ghostwriting FAQ, DENNIS LOWERY, http://www.dennislowery.com/bl
og/ghostwriting-faq.html (last visited May 22, 2013) ("Q: Does the ghostwriter get a credit
57
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The experiments reported below test these propositions. Following earlier
literature, we assume that creators value opportunities for publication and for
attribution. Accordingly, when given a chance to trade off monetary
compensation for those opportunities, they will do so, resulting in lower WTA
numbers that are closer to the prices that prospective buyers might be willing
to pay for them.
It is worth commenting on one of the assumptions of this model. Earlier we
explained that creators might value attribution for economic or moral reasons.
They might desire attribution as an opportunity to achieve greater financial or
artistic success in the future, and they might desire attribution because they
believe they have some ethical right to have their names attached to their
works. Although one of these preferences is economic and the other moral, we
assume that whichever reason the creator has for valuing attribution, she will
be willing to engage in market exchanges to receive it.
II.

THE CURRENT STUDIES

We performed three separate experiments to test the propositions discussed
above. The first two studies tested the value that creators attach to attribution
and publication. They used the same methods, but employed different samples.
The first involved "lay" creative subjects, those who indicated an interest in
photography. The second involved professional and serious amateur creators.
The third study, which employed a wholly different experimental design,
explored the economic effects of creating a waivable default attribution right.
Experiment 1: Valuing Attribution - Mechanical Turk Study

A.

1.

Mechanical Turk Methods

For the first experiment, we recruited 200 participants using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a service that connects people with online "human
intelligence tasks" (HITs).59 We listed a HIT on mTurk titled "Aspiring
on the book? As mentioned above, depending on the arrangement, attribution or even coauthor credit could be negotiated. If the author/client will give the ghostwriter attribution or
credit their contribution, the fee decreases or they can choose to have their name solely on
the book at the standard ghostwriting rate."), and 7 Questions to Ask Before You Hire a
Ghostwriter, BOBBI LINKEMER, http://www.writeanonfictionbook.com/ARTICLES/7 _Questi
on_Ghostwriter.html (last visited May 22, 2013) ("Acknowledgement in print is often
considered part of the fee."), with Julia Moskin, I Was a Cookbook Ghostwriter, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, at D1 ("Because cookbook ghostwriting brings low pay, nonexistent
royalties (most writers are paid a flat fee, or a percentage of the advance doled out by the
publisher) and only a few perks, most ghosts don't last long. When a ghosted book is
successful, watching someone else get credit for your work is demoralizing.").
59 AMAzON MECHANICAL TuRK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited
May 22, 2013) ("Mechanical Turk is a marketplace for work. We give businesses and
developers access to an on-demand, scalable workforce. Workers select from thousands of
[HITs] and work whenever it's convenient.").
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Photographers Wanted for a Contest and Study About How People Use Digital
Photos." We also provided a short description of the task. 60
mTurk participants were directed to the Qualtrics survey website, 61 where
they consented to participate in the study. They uploaded a digital photograph
they had taken themselves, and were instructed that it was not to include any
other people. 62 The contest rules appeared next; participants learned that their
picture would be judged against ninety-nine other photographs by a
photography expert and that the winning photograph would receive a prize of
$1000.
At this point, the participants were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions, described below.

a.

Contest Condition

In this condition, participants were told that their photograph would be
viewed by a buyer before any judging would take place. The buyer would
make a cash offer which, if accepted by the photographer, would result in the
transfer of the opportunity to win the $1000 prize from the photographer to the
buyer. The offer was not for the photograph itself, but only for the right to be
paid the prize if the photograph was judged the winner. We will refer to this as
the photograph's contest rights.
Once informed of the rules, the photographer's WTA was elicited, that is,
she was asked to specify the lowest amount she would accept to sell her
photograph's contest rights. She was told that if the buyer's offer for her
photograph's contest rights was higher than her WTA, then she would
automatically receive that offer in cash payable through mTurk, and she would
not receive the $1000 should her photograph win the contest. If the offer was
lower, then she would not receive any cash from the buyer but could still
receive the $ 1000 if her photograph won. This condition replicated those used
in our previous studies of the creativity effect. 63
b.

Publication Condition

The price elicitation and offer structure in the second condition were
identical to the Contest condition. The change from the first condition involved

60 Subjects were told: "You will upload a digital photo of nature that you've taken and
answer some questions about it. Your photo will then be entered in a contest and judged by
photography experts. Prizes may include cash and/or publication on a major website."
61 QuALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited May 22, 2013).
62
This proviso was included to allay privacy concerns raised by the University of
Virginia's Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral Sciences (IRB), which was
the human subjects research review body that approved this study. See Institutional Review
Board for Social & Behavioral Sciences, U. VA., http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/irb/sbs (last
visited May 22, 2013).
63
See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 34-35; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 17-31 .
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the prize being offered. In the Publication condition, the photographers were
offered the opportunity to have their photo published, uncredited, on a major
website. But the possibility of publication would arise only if the photograph
(1) had been sold to the buyer and (2) it won the contest. That is:
•

If the photographer's WTA was lower than the buyer's offer, then the
photographer would receive the offer in cash. If the photograph then
won the contest, the photographer would not receive the $1000 but
would have the photograph published, albeit without the
photographer's name.

•

If the photographer's WTA was higher than the offer, then the
photographer would receive no cash from the buyer. If the photograph
won the contest, the photographer would receive the $1000 prize, but
the photograph would not be published.

c.

Attribution Condition

This condition was identical to the Publication condition, but if the
conditions specified above were met, the photograph would be published along
with the photographer 's name. Again, if the photographer' s WTA was lower
than the offer, she would receive the cash offer. If the photograph won the
contest, the photographer would not win the $ 1000 prize but would have the
credited photograph published. If the WTA was higher than the offer, then the
photographer would not receive the cash offer. If the photograph won the
contest, then the photographer would receive the $1000 prize, but not have the
credited photograph published.
We structured the conditions this way in order to determine whether our
photographer subjects valued publication and attribution, and whether their
attraction to these prospects would reduce their WTA relative to a situation in
which publication and attribution were not available. If they attached a
significant value to the prospect of publication, then we would expect to see
subjects in the Publication condition report lower WTA than those in the
Contest condition. If they attached a significant value to the prospect of
attribution, we would expect to see subjects in the Attribution condition report
lower WTA than in both the Publication and Contest conditions.
After the rules were explained, and comprehension checked, participants
entered their WTA. Participants were asked a series of questions about their
perceptions of the quality of their photographs and their emotional attachment
to them.64 We also asked several demographic questions. Participants were

64

The questions were as follows :
"How good is your photograph?" Responses were elicited on a seven point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (Very Bad) to 7 (Very Good).
"What are the chances (the probability) that your photograph is going to win the
prize?" Responses were elicited on a 0-100 slider scale, indicating a percentage.
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then thanked, and the experiment ended. In a departure from our previous
studies, we did not recruit a separate pool of buyers in this experiment since
our interest was only in the differences between creators' WTA. 65
2.

Mechanical Turk Results

Of the 200 participants recruited using mTurk, twenty were excluded for
answering one or both of the rule comprehension questions incorrectly. Based
on the scholarly literature reviewed above, we hypothesized that creators
would find the prospect of publication with attribution to be the most valuable,
and that the WTA for the Attribution condition would thus be significantly
lower than in the Publication or Contest conditions. 66 Our hypotheses with
respect to the Publication condition were less clear. If subjects valued the
opportunity to get their work "out there" even without their names attached,
then WTA in the Publication condition should be lower than in the Contest
condition. But if subjects were indifferent to the opportunity for publication
without credit or, moreover, if they were hostile to the idea, then WT A in the
Publication and Contest conditions should not diverge.
We first compared participants in either the Contest or Publication
condition, on the one hand, with those in the Attribution condition, on the
other. This comparison allowed us to assess the subjects' behavior in the
conditions where attribution was not available (Contest, Publication) versus the
condition where it was (Attribution). The subjects in the Attribution condition
did, as expected, report a significantly lower WTA than Contest or Publication
subjects - that is, subjects in the two conditions where there was no prospect of
attribution (Contest/Publication M = $202.26, Attribution M = $132.28, 1(180)
= 1.98, p = 0.05). Thus, when subjects were offered a chance to receive credit
along with publication of their work, they significantly reduced the amount of
money they were willing to accept to part with their chance to win the $1000
contest compared with the WTA reported when they were not given a chance
to receive credit. Furthermore, participants in the Attribution condition
reported lower WTA than participants in the Publication condition standing
alone (that is, not grouped with the Contest condition) (Publication M =
$226.76, Attribution M = $132.28, t(180) = 1.97, p = 0.052), and this
difference was on the edge of significance.
Interestingly, the other dyadic comparisons were not significant at the p =
0.05 confidence level. Subjects' WTA in the Attribution condition was lower

"How would you rate your level of personal and emotional investment or
attachment to your photograph?" Responses were elicited on a seven point Likert scale
from l (Very Low) to 7 (Very High).
65 We received permission from the IRB to engage in this minor deceit, and subjects
were told about it at the end of the experiment.
66
Recall that because of the way our study is designed, attaching a higher value to
attribution should result in a lower WTA in the Attribution condition, because creators are
willing to sacrifice more monetary compensation in order to receive attribution.
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than in the Contest condition but only at the p = 0.10 level of significance. The
difference between Publication and Contest was also significant at p = 0.10,
but in the wrong direction: subjects' WTA for publication without credit was
higher than it was merely for the chance to win the prize. These results are
summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1 below.
Table 1.
Condition

N

Mean

Contest
Publication
Attribution
Contest + Publication

60
61
59
121

177.35
226.768
132.288 ' 0
202,26°

SD
260.86
330.58
174.92
297.85

Figure 1.

$300.00
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$200.00
$150.00
$100.00
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r-1 rl
•I •• •• •
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Publication

Attribution

a: means differ at a p < 0.10 level
b: means differ at a p = 0.05 level

Contest +
Publication
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Mechanical Turk Discussion

We draw several conclusions from these results. First, they align with what
we have found in previous related experiments67 involving poems and
paintings - that is, the creators of works value them substantially more than the
neoclassical model predicts. 68 Our photographers behaved similarly to the
poets and painters in our previous experiments, and set their WTA
significantly higher than their expected mean value. We did not have subjects
act as buyers in this protocol, but given the enormous spread between the
rational expected value of the contest chance ($10) and the subjects' WTA,
which varied on average between $132 (Attribution) and $226 (Publication),
we strongly suspect that there would be a very large gap between sellers and
buyers were we to modify the protocol to include subjects acting as buyers. 69
Thus, although they are not a direct confirmation of our previous findings
(because of the different protocols used), our results do align with and support
what we have found previously.
Our main finding is that the prospect of publication with attribution results
in a significantly lower WTA compared to the WTA reported by subjects in the
Contest and Publication conditions pooled together. This finding suggests that
the prospect of publication with attribution has a modest but nonetheless
statistically significant effect of reducing WTA compared to a situation where
subjects are not offered the prospect of publication with attribution.
Interestingly, the Contest and Publication conditions showed no significant
difference. Recall that we were uncertain whether subjects would find
uncredited publication attractive enough to meaningfully reduce their WTA.
The WTA reported by subjects in the Publication condition was, on average,

67
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 36-43; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 17-25.
68 When reporting our previous results, commentators occasionally asked whether the
heightened valuation data were based on the relatively low size of the prizes. Perhaps, they
thought, subjects were particularly risk-seeking with low value ($100) prizes and would be
more rational with a larger amount of money at stake. The results of this study suggest that
this is not the case. With $ 1000 prize, subjects valued their works significantly more than
the rational expected value of the prize. For more discussion of this point, see infra note 72.
69 These gaps are consistent with data from another study we conducted, which was
identical to the one reported here, except that the prize was $50 and there were ten
photographs competing for it, yielding an expected value of $5 per entry. In that study, the
mean valuations were:
Contest= $23 .15 (46.3% of the total prize)
Publication= $21.46 (42.9% of the total prize)
Attribution= $19.32 (38.6% of the total prize)
When we compare the Attribution condition with the two non-attribution conditions
combined, the difference in mean values is marginally significant (p = 0.058). These ratios
are reasonably consistent both with the results reported in our prior experiments and with
our results in the experiments reported in this Article. For more discussion of these issues,
see supra note 68 and infra note 72.

a

2013]

WHAT'S A NAME WORTH?

1411

higher than the mean WTA reported in the Contest condition. Why might this
be? Perhaps subjects found unattractive the prospect of publication of their
photo without attribution. 70 This is consistent with the Creative Commons data
described in Part I.B.1 regarding the minimal attractiveness of licenses that did
not require attribution.71 Given the strong preference for attribution,
publication without attribution may be viewed negatively, which would
account for the higher average WTA in the Publication condition versus the
Contest condition. But the difference, it must be remembered, was not
significant at the 0.05 confidence level (but it was significant at the 0.10 level),
so it is also possible that the higher WTA in the Publication condition was
driven by chance rather than the difference between the conditions.
We were also surprised that the Contest/Attribution dyad did not manifest a
significant difference: although WTA in the Attribution condition was lower
than in the Contest condition, that difference was not significant at the 0.05
confidence level (but it was significant at the 0.10 level). Given the weakness
of this assoc1at1on, and given the borderline significance in the
Publication/Attribution dyad, we read these results to suggest that the subjects
in the mTurk study, who were not professional photographers but were
selected to be representative of the general population, had at best a modest
desire for publication with attribution. These results may suggest that
nonprofessional creators place some value on the prospect of credited
publication, but that attribution is not likely to serve as a complete curb on the
tendency of non-professional creators to overvalue their works. 72
70
Note that the publication condition signals two different things to an IP creator, which
would have different impacts on the WTA measure. First, the opportunity to have a photo
published should obviously decrease a photographer's WTA (if she values being published
at all). Because it was necessary to explicitly state that the photographer would not receive
any attribution in this condition, however, this should raise the photographer's WTA, as it is
less valuable to be published without attribution than with attribution. Depending upon
which signal was stronger, a photographer could reasonably have a higher WT A, especially
under an assumption of"coherent arbitrariness." See infra Part 11.C (Experiment 3).
That there are two signals operating in opposite directions is evidenced by Levene's test
for equality of variances. There was marginally more variance in the publication condition
than the contest condition (F(l, 180) = 3.27, p = 0.073). This indicates that there was
marginally more disagreement between photographers on the proper valuation of
publication as compared to the proper valuation of the contest.
71
Indeed, since 2004 all Creative Commons licenses require attribution as a condition of
use as there was insufficient demand for licenses that did not. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
72 Subjects in all conditions reported WTA significantly higher than what a rational
choice model would predict ($ 10). These results align, as we have already noted, with the
findings of our previous experiments. Nonetheless, we can check whether the subjects
understood the basic structure of the task by comparing what the subjects reported regarding
their self-perceived probability of winning the contest with reported WTA. If the subjects
understood the task, as the former increases, so too should the latter. And we do see a strong
association between subjects' reported percentage chance to win and their WTA: the
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Experiment 2: Valuing Attribution - Professional and Advanced Amateur
Photographers
1.

Methods and Results

We turned next to investigate whether professional and advanced amateur
photographers would behave differently from the casual snapshooters in our
mTurk subject pool. We recruited eighty-eight participants with the aid of two
photography affinity groups, the Charlottesville Photography Initiative (CPI), a
membership group of professional and advanced amateur photographers based
in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Photo District News (PDN), the largest U.S.
monthly magazine for professional photographers. In contrast to subjects in the
mTurk sample, who reported spending an average of 5.56 hours per week on
photography, the participants in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending an
average 21.24 hours per week on photography. Fully 72.4% of subjects in the
CPI/PDN sample reported spending at least ten hours per week on
photography, compared to the 81.7% of subjects in the mTurk sample who
spent fewer than ten hours per week on photography.
The study design was identical to that used for the mTurk participants, with
subjects randomly assigned to the Contest, Publication, or Attribution
conditions. Eleven participants were excluded from analysis due to failure to
understand the rules of the experiment. The remaining seventy-seven
participants showed a pattern somewhat different from the mTurk sample. As
with the mTurk subjects, participants in the Attribution condition reported a
coefficient of correlation (r) between the probability of winning and WTA is 0.38, which is
significantly different than 0, and indeed the reported probability of winning emerges as by
far the most predictive factor of WTA in a regression analysis.
We should note that although the strong correlation between the subjects' perceived
probability of winning the contest and their WTA suggests that the participants understood
the task and behaved rationally given their perceptions of their chances, the subjects'
subjective perception of the likelihood that they would prevail are, on average, significantly
overoptimistic. Only 5.6% of the sample reported that they believed their probability of
winning was 1% or lower, the probability if the judges picked the winner of the contest at
random. Fully 47.2% of the sample responded that their chances of winning were better than
50%. As an illustration, a well-calibrated, rational sample could have at most two
participants reporting their chances were 50% and the rest reporting 0. A well-calibrated,
rational sample will have a sum of probabilities of winning (for 180 subjects, each of whom
was led by the experimenters to believe that he had a 1% average chance of winning) of
180%. Compare that to the sum of probabilities observed- which amount to 7862.4% (!)and you begin to understand the extent to which overoptimism shapes our results.
Additionally, and importantly, none of the other measures differed as a function of
condition. If the subjects understand the task correctly, their predicted probability of
winning should not change· between conditions, as the assumptions about the likelihood of
winning (for example, how many other participants there are, the estimated quality of the
other participants' photos, and so forth) do not vary. The fact that perceived probability of
winning stays roughly constant across conditions suggests that differences in WTA are
being driven by the individual's valuation of publication and attribution.
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WT A lower than that reported by the pooled Contest and Publication subjects,
and the difference was on the edge of significance at the 0.05 level
(Contest/Publication M = 380.44, Attribution M = 234.79, t = 1.97,p = 0.052).
Unlike in the mTurk study, however, the dyadic comparisons revealed that
participants in the Attribution condition reported significantly lower WTA than
those in the Contest condition (Contest M = 440.25, Attribution M = 234.79, t
= 2.098, p = 0.044). Compared to the condition in which creators were merely
offered a chance to win the $ 1000 prize, subjects who were offered a chance to
have their photographs appear in a major media outlet with their names
attached reduced their WTA by almost fifty percent.
Interestingly, in this sample of professional and serious amateur
photographers, the pattern of the WTA responses was consistent with the
hypothesis that creators attach some positive value to publication even in the
absence of attribution, although the data, given our smaller sample size, do not
reach statistical significance (Contest M = $440.25, Publication+ Attribution
M = $287.90, t = 1.66, p = 0.10). It is possible that a larger sample would
reduce the variability of our data resulting in significant differences between
Contest and Publication and between Publication and Attribution. 73 These
results are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2 below.

Table 2.
Condition
Contest
Publication
Attribution
Contest + Publication

73

N
20
29
28
49

Mean
440.25 8
339.19
234.798,D
380.44°

SD
384.20
409.04
248.90
398.18

Once again, differences in the other dependent variables failed to emerge between
conditions. Most importantly, participants were not more likely to believe in their
probability of winning the contest as a function of the condition, nor did their valuation of
the nonmonetary benefits of winning the contest vary.
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Figure 2.
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2.

Discussion

As in the mTurk study, the CPI/PON study broadly aligns with our previous
experiments involving poems and paintings. 74 In all of these instances, creators
reported WTAs that were, on average, far above what the rational choice
model would predict. And in the CPI/PON study, professional and advanced
amateur photographers reported average WTAs that were even higher than the
significantly inflated WT As reported by the casual snapshooters in the mTurk
study. One might hypothesize that the subjects in our CPI/PON study would
have reported lower WTAs than those in the mTurk study because they had, on
average, far more experience as photographers and would therefore have a
more realistic appraisal of their photograph's chance of winning the contest.
But we saw no such effect. 75 ·

74
See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 43; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 25 .
75
If anything, the opposite proved to be the case: the CPI/PDN subjects reported an even
higher perceived likelihood of winning the contest, though not significantly so (mTurk M =
43.68 (27.58), CPI/PDN M = 48.42 (32.80), t = 1.11, n.s.). This even more intense
overoptimism translated into higher WTA: again, we found a powerful correlation between
the perceived chance of winning and WTA (mTurk r = 0.239, CPI/PDN r = 0.383, both
coefficients of correlation being significant at the 0.001 level) .
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Second, and most importantly, the data from the CPI/PDN subjects suggest
that professional and advanced amateur photographers place a somewhat
greater value on the prospect of publication with attribution compared with
their mTurk counterparts. CPI/PDN subjects' WTA in the Attribution
condition was lower by a significant amount compared to the Contest subjects'
WTA. This is fairly strong evidence that creators attach some substantial value
to credited publication of their work.
Using the subjects' responses, we can roughly calculate the value they
attach to the prospect of publication with attribution. The difference in mean
WT A between those in the Attribution condition and those in the Contest
condition is $205.46. But the photographers only would have received
attributed publication if their photograph won the prize. Thus, the average
value they assigned to attribution can be thought of as the difference between
the conditions' means divided by subjects' perceived chance of winning the
prize. Across conditions, subjects' mean expected probability of winning the
prize was 49.5%. Accordingly, the creators' behavior indicates that they valued
attribution at $415.07.76 We observe a similar pattern, though to a lesser
degree, in the mTurk sample. The difference in WTA between the Contest and
Attribution conditions was $45.07, and the estimated probability of winning
across conditions was 42.38%, indicating a valuation of attribution of $106.35.
Again, this is broadly in line with what we would expect and what our overall
results suggest: our professional and advanced amateur photographers value
attribution far more than do our casual snapshooters.
We should emphasize, however, that although the prospect of publication
with attribution does meaningfully reduce WTA, the subjects in the Attribution
condition still reported a mean WTA enormously in excess of what the rational
choice model would predict ($234. 79 compared to an expected value of $10).
Thus, at least based on this study, we do not believe that the prospect of
attribution is sufficient to eliminate the creativity effect shown in previous
experiments.
A third, related observation arises from a comparison of subjects' WTA in
the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies with those reported in the earlier poetry and
painting studies. Mean WTA in every condition in both the mTurk and
CPI/PDN studies exceeded the average rational choice expected value of the
76
This is consistent with research showing that 50% probability often represents
"epistemic uncertainty," rather than an actual estimation of a 0.5 probability of the event
occurring. See Wlindi Bruine de Bruin et al., What Number is "Fifty-Fifty"?: Redistributing
Excessive 50% Responses in Elicited Probabilities, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 713 , 714 (2002);
Barauch Fischhoff & Wlindi Bruine de Bruin, Fifty-Fifty = 50%?, 12 J. BEHAV.
DECISIONMAKING 149, 150 (1999). We do use a slider scale that represents the entire range
from 0% to l 00%, which Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin show reduces (but does not
eliminate) this response bias. Obviously, it would be highly irrational for subjects to believe
they have a 50% chance of winning a contest with 100 entries. Nonetheless, subjects'
probability estimates do vary consistently with increases or decreases in their WTA
amounts.
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prize by a multiple far greater than mean WTA reported in either the poetry or
painting studies. 77 Why might this be?
One difference between those studies was the size of the prize offered for
winning the contest. In the poetry and painting studies, these were $50 and
$100, respectively, and both prior studies involved contests with 10
participants, so the average rational choice expected value of the prize in those
studies was therefore $5 and $10, respectively.78 In the mTurk and CPI/PDN
studies, by contrast, the contest offered a $1000 prize with a pool of 100
participants, resulting in an average expected value of $10. In each study,
creators' WTA was a multiple of the rational expected value, but the multiples
grew along with the size of the prize on offer.79 One might have hypothesized
that a larger prize would focus subjects' attention on the value of their chance
and would therefore move subjects' WTA closer to the rational choice value.
Alternatively, one might have hypothesized that a larger prize would be so
attractive to subjects, and the prospect of winning so alluring, that the subjects'
average WTA would grow along with the prize. This second hypothesis
obviously fits better with our data: our subjects appear to be focusing
substantially more on the magnitude of the prize than on the probability of
winning it. 80 Of course, we have not yet tested this proposition directly, and
our results are therefore, on this point, only suggestive. Nonetheless, our
findings raise the possibility that the larger average valuation in this study
relative to our earlier work means that in IP markets in which the "winner" can
expect to reap large rewards, creators will be especially prone to overestimate
their chances of prevailing and, consequently, overvalue their work.

77
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 39 (reporting a mean WTA
for painters of $74.59 for a prize with a rational expected value of $IO); Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 22, 24 (reporting a mean WTA for poem authors of
$22.90 in the "eyes closed" contest, $20.05 in the "eyes open" contest, and $18.92 in the
lottery experiment for a prize with a rational expected value of $5).
78
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 37; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 19.
79
The results seem fairly large in absolute dollar amounts. Relative to the total possible
prize (which was the maximum amount they could report), however, the rates were on a par
with the previous results. In the current studies, the WTA averages range from 13.23% to
22.68% (mTurk sample) and from 23.48% to 44.03% (advanced and professional samples)
of the total possible prize. For comparison, the IP creators in the painting study reported an
average WTA of 74.59% of the $100 prize, while the IP creators in the poetry study
reported WTA averages of37.84% to 45.80% of the $50 prize. See supra note 77.
8 For similar findings, see Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses,
and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology ofRisk, 12 PSYCHOL. Ser. 185, 188 (2001)
(finding that the typical subject was willing to pay $10 to avoid a 99% chance of a painful
electric shock, and $7 to avoid a I% chance of the same shock).
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Experiment 3: Studying a Default Attribution Right

C.

The results of the experiments reported above indicate that creators value
attribution and are willing to sacrifice financial benefits to obtain it. These
results could have important implications in the debate about default
attribution rights in IP law. Those studies did not, however, specifically test the
effects of creating a default attribution right similar to what we find in the
copyright laws of many European countries, a feature that some have
suggested U.S. law should adopt. In order to enter more directly into the debate
over attribution rights, we conducted a third study, employing a wholly
different research protocol, to evaluate the economic effects of a default
waivable attribution right.
Default rules, which dictate legal outcomes when parties are silent, are a
prominent feature of the law, and they have been widely studied by social
scientists and legal scholars. 81 According to economic theory, in the absence of
transaction costs, default rules should have no effect on people's behavior. If
the parties to a contract, for example, would prefer a rule other than the one
stipulated by the default, they will simply contract around the default. 82 The
same goes for other kinds of default rules, such as those dealing with organ
donation, employee benefit plans, and insurance rates.83 Imagine that the
default rule regarding organ donation is not to donate, but you only have to
check a box to become an organ donor (a small transaction cost). Under these
conditions, it seems that if you want to be an organ donor, you will simply
check the box. And the opposite should be true if donation is set as the default
but you don't want to donate: you'll check the box removing yourself from the
donor list.
In dozens of studies, however, this economic assumption has been
rejected. 84 Default rules are often incredibly "sticky": even when transaction
costs are low or nonexistent, people tend to stay with the default selection
rather than switching.85 For example, in an experiment testing organ donation
81

See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83-87 (2008); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 91 (1989); Ornri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory ofDefault Rules, 109 COLUM.
L. Rev. 396, 396 (2009); Ornri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 651, 651 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L . REV. 608, 611-12 (1997); Jason Scott
Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615, 615-16 (1990).
82 Korobkin, supra note 81, at 611.
83 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 159-82.
84 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 133
(2002).
85 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81 , at 34-35; Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies:
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991,
at 193, 197-98 (1991); Korobkin, supra note 81, at 625-30; William Samuelson & Richard

1418

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1389

rates, when the default rule was set as nondonation and subjects had to click a
box to become a donor, only forty-two percent did so. 86 When the default was
changed to donation, however, eighty-two percent agreed to be donors. 87
Similar findings emerge from the real world. 88 These results suggest that the
default rule can have significant effects on human behavior. We explore some
of the reasons why below. 89
Our third study is the first to test the power of a waivable default attribution
right for IP. The study is designed to test not only the power of different
default rules but also the economic value of the difference between them.
I.

Methods

For this study, we again recruited subjects from mTurk, advertising for
subjects who were aspiring photographers interested in having their work
entered into a contest. They were offered $2 for participating. Potential
subjects were directed to a Qualtrics website where the experiment was hosted.
After reading a consent form, subjects were asked to upload a photograph of
nature that they had taken. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of two
conditions.
In the first condition, which we will refer to here as "Default Attribution,"
subjects were told that their photograph, along with those of four other
participants, would be shown to a graphic designer who was participating in a
design contest with a prize of $200. In order to participate in the design
contest, the designer needed to purchase the rights to use one of the five
photographs as the basis for his design. Subjects were told that the designer
might edit and crop the image and add text and other graphics to it. In order to
use one of the images, the designer would have to strike a deal with the
photographer.
Subjects in the first condition were told that if they made a deal with the
designer and the designer's creation won the contest, the finished design would
appear on a major website with both the designer's and the photographer 's
names. The photographer would receive the agreed upon price for the
photograph, but she would not be eligible to win the $200 contest prize. The
subjects were then asked to indicate the least amount of money they would be
willing to accept to allow the designer to use their photograph (WTA:Att).
After entering WTA:Att, the subjects were then directed to a new screen.
Here they were told, "Some designers have indicated that they do not want to

Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
86 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 S CIENCE 1338,
1338 (2003).
81 Id.
88

Id. (observing that in Germany, where the default is not to donate, only twelve percent
of people do so, but in Austria, where the default is donation, ninety-nine percent of people
do).
89 See infra Part III.
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share credit for the design with the photographer." Subjects were then
reminded of their WTA:Att. Then they were told, "Now you will be asked to
indicate the least amount of money you would be willing to accept to allow the
designer to use your photograph without credit. If you do not care about credit,
you can put the same price." They were then asked to specify the least amount
of money they would be willing to accept to allow the designer to use the
photograph without attribution (WT A:NoAtt). Subjects were then asked a
series of follow-up and demographic questions.
Photographers in this Default Attribution condition were, in effect, selling
their default right to attribution. Based on our findings from the previous
studies, we expected that they would demand more money for an uncredited
use of their image than a credited use (WTA:NoAtt > WTA:Att).
In the second condition, which we will refer to here as "No Default
Attribution," the statements regarding credit were reversed. On the first screen,
subjects were told that if they licensed the photograph and the design won the
contest, the final design would appear on a major website with only the
designer 's name. Subjects were then asked for their willingness to accept this
uncredited use (WT A:NoAtt). On the next screen they were told, "Some
designers have indicated that they are willing to share credit for the design with
the photographer." The subjects were reminded of their WTA:NoAtt and were
asked to indicate their WTA with credit (WTA:Att). They then answered a
series of follow-up and demographic questions.
In the No Default Attribution condition, subjects were, in effect, buying
attribution. Again, our previous studies indicated that since attribution has
economic value for creators, they should be willing to pay something to
receive it. They could manifest their willingness to pay for attribution by
reducing the amount they were initially willing to accept for uncredited use of
the photo (WTA:NoAtt > WTA:Att).
2.

Results

The results of this third study confirmed those of the first two reported in
this Article. As expected, subjects altered the amount of money they were
willing to accept in ways that were consistent with placing a significant
economic value on attribution.90 More importantly, however, this study
suggests that a waivable default attribution rule could have a significant - and
negative - effect on the efficiency of markets to license IP.
In the Default Attribution condition, subjects' initial WT A:Att for credited
use of their photos averaged $40.17 (standard deviation = $46.69), while they
demanded $54.94 (standard deviation = $59.57) for uncredited use of their
photos (WTA:NoAtt). A paired samples T-Test indicated that this difference is
highly statistically significant (t(205) = 6.265, p « 0.001). Subjects given an
opportunity to "sell" their attribution right demanded almost $15 on average to
do so.
90

See infra Figure 3.
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In the No Default Attribution condition, subjects also altered their
willingness to accept in a manner consistent with valuing attribution. Their
initial WTA:NoAtt for uncredited use averaged $42.36 (standard deviation =
$46.88), yet they were willing to accept only $38 .75 (standard deviation =
$47.90) in order to receive credit (WTA:Att). Again, a paired samples T-Test
indicated that this difference is highly statistically significant (!(213) = 2.250, p
= 0.012). Here, subjects who were given an opportunity to "buy" attribution
(by reducing their WTA) were willing to give up $3.61 to obtain it.
The most important finding involves the significant difference between how
subjects in the two conditions valued attribution. When we compare the
amount that subjects valued attribution across the two conditions, we see that
the default rule had a substantial effect. When attribution was set as the default
(WTA:Att), the difference between the two WTA amounts was $14.77, yet
when attribution was not the default (WTA:NoAtt), the difference was only
$3.61. An independent samples T-Test indicated a highly significant difference
between the two conditions (t(418) = 5.24,p = 0.017). When the subjects were
initially endowed with a right to attribution, they valued it substantially more
than they did when they were not so endowed and had to purchase it. In our
study, subjects valued attribution four times higher under the Default
Attribution condition than when the default was no attribution. Again, the
neoclassical model would not predict this result. But it is broadly in line with
our previous findings and with the voluminous literature limning the
significant effect that defaults can have in shaping behavior.
Figure 3.
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Discussion

Before we discuss the legal implications of our findings, it is important that
we address the possible psychological explanations for our results in
Experiment 3. According to neoclassical economic theory, the differences in
default rules about attribution should not have significantly affected subjects'
valuation of attribution. 91 This is because people's preferences about
attribution (or anything else, for that matter) are thought to be stable and
exogenous to the way the choice is structured. 92 That is to say, the amount that
someone values attribution should not change based on irrelevant aspects of
how his valuation is elicited.
Over the course of the last three decades, however, substantial research in
the behavioral sciences has undermined the assumption that people have stable,
well-defined preferences. 93 In many instances, it seems, people's preferences
are constructed by the way choices are framed. This has consistently been
shown in the context of changes in default rules. 94 As we mentioned above, if
people have stable preferences, then, when transaction costs are small, default
rules should have no effect. If people do not like the default, they can simply
switch out of it. But as the organ donation studies show, default rules can be
very sticky. 95 Even when transaction costs are low, people tend to remain with
the default choice. 96
Even stable, well-defined preferences can sometimes lead to puzzling
patterns depending on what the default choice is, especially in situations where
it is unclear how to value the item in question. For example, people are
incredibly consistent in valuing novel pain experiences in relation to one
another. 97 In one study, participants who were asked to indicate how much
they would have to be paid to listen to unpleasant noises always demanded
more money to listen to sixty seconds of the noise than ten seconds of the
noise. 98 Importantly, however, .the amounts of money they demanded were
highly dependent upon whether they saw an irrelevant price of 50¢ or 10¢
beforehand.99 Those who saw a higher price demanded more to listen to the
91

See Korobkin, supra note 81, at 611.

92

Id.

93

See Amos Tversky · & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453,453 (1981).
94
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 86.
95 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 86, at 1338.
96

97

Id.

See Dan Ariely et al., "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without
Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 80-84 (2003) (finding, in an experiment where
subjects were asked to listen to an annoying sound with varying default "anchor" prices,
"arbitrary but coherent pricing of painful experiences, even when there is no uncertainty
about the nature or duration of the experience").
98 Id.
99 Id. (finding a "powerful effect of the anchoring manipulation").
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unpleasant noise, such that often participants in the high-price condition
demanded more payment for a thirty second noise than participants in the lowprice condition demanded for a sixty second noise. 100 There was no
convergence over several trials, indicating that the impact of the default can
persist even with experience in the market. 101
This behavior is known as "coherent arbitrariness." 102 People's preferences
are coherent when comparing two different conditions to one another. They
demand more money the more unpleasant the condition, but their preferences
are arbitrary with respect to the amount of money they assign to each condition
generally. Subjects have stable preferences between sixty seconds of
unpleasantness and thirty seconds of unpleasantness, but they are not sure how
to assign prices to these preferences in the abstract. 103 They anchor on an initial
irrelevant figure and vary accordingly.1 04
Compare these results with ours in Experiment 3. Our participants
presumably had stable preferences that attribution is more valuable than none,
but they had no strong ideas about how much attribution was worth in a
vacuum. We found that there is basically no statistically significant difference
between WTA:Att in the Default Attribution condition ($40.17) and WTA:Att
in the No Default Attribution condition ($38.75), regardless of whether this
included attribution rights (t(418) = 0.480, n.s.). In Experiment 3, subjects in
both conditions set their initial WTA at about $40. Presumably they
determined this price by dividing the $200 prize that the designer was
competing for by the number of photographs the designer was being shown - a
completely arbitrary price. 105 Having set their initial prices, however,
participants consistently and predictably adjusted in the correct direction to
trade attribution rights for money. These results look very much like coherent
arbitrariness: an arbitrary initial valuation when it is unclear how to price,
followed by coherent valuations that key off the initial price once it has been
established.
Coherent arbitrariness helps explain how our participants set their initial
valuations and how they varied from them, but it does not explain why the
variation was so different between conditions. This variation is likely an effect
of the ways in which default rules can affect people's decisions. Defaults are

100
101
102
103

Id. at 83 fig.I.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 97.
Id.

104 Id. See generally Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., Recommendations Implicit in Policy
Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 414 (2006); Shlomi Sher & Craig R.M. McKenzie, Information
Leakage from Logically Equivalent Frames, 101 COGNITION 467 (2006).
105
Subjects were given no information about the number of designers who were
competing for the $200 prize, so the subjects could not estimate the designers' expected
winnings. Accordingly, there was no reason for them to believe that designers would be
willing to pay this much to use their photographs.
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powerful in part because people have a tendency to treat the default as the
status quo. 106 Numerous studies have shown that people tend to be biased in
favor of the status quo. 107 This is due, in part, to the possibility that the status
quo - at least when it gives a person some right or claim - may begin to feel
like an endowment, something owned by the person, such that changes from
the status quo then feel like losses of the endowment. 108 People are generally
loss averse, and, as many studies, including our own, have shown, people tend
to substantially overvalue things with which they are endowed. 109
Another explanation for the stickiness of defaults is based on the possibility
that people treat defaults as expressions of appropriate or preferred behavior,
and, in the absence of strong preferences of their own, tend to follow the
implicit suggestion of the "choice architect." 110 People may assume that the
default was chosen for a reason and conform with it because they trust the
signal being sent. 111
Although it is difficult to know, we suspect that the additional value the
subjects in our study attached to attribution derives primarily from the former
explanation (status quo bias and loss aversion) rather than any normative or
expressive content conveyed by the default. In the Default Attribution
condition, the right to attribution had become part of the subjects' endowment;
it was something they owned that they were being asked to sell. Conversely, in
the No Default Attribution condition, subjects were not initially endowed with
the attribution right and were asked, in effect, to purchase it by lowering their
WTA. In both conditions subjects significantly valued attribution, but in the
first condition, they seemed to have given more weight to losing something
they already owned than to purchasing something they did not yet own. This
result is consistent with the expansive literature on the status quo bias and the
endowment effect.
We also tested the possibility that the difference in valuations might be
caused by the expressive nature of the default. 112 Our findings did not support
that hypothesis. We ran an additional pair of conditions that were identical to
106
Korobkin, supra note 81, at 631 ("[T]he default term that governs the parties might
appear to parties to represent the status quo allocation of rights and responsibilities.").
107 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 86, at 1338; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra
note 85, at 8.
108 Korobkin, supra note 81 , at 625 .
109
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 31 ; Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 7-8; Kahneman et al., supra note 85, at 194;
Kahneman et al., supra note 10, at 1328.
110
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 83-87; Sher & McKenzie, supra note 104, at
487; Sunstein, supra note 84, at 114-15 (" It seems reasonable to speculate that in many
cases, the default rule carries information about ordinary or sensible practice.").
111
See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 340 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2032 (1996).
112
Sunstein, supra note 84, at 114-15.
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those reported above but in which subjects were explicitly told that the initial
condition (either Default Attribution or No Default Attribution) was based on
U.S. copyright law. 113 We thought that an explicit mention of the law would
strengthen the expressive signal of the default condition. In fact, however,
subjects did not value attribution any differently in the two versions of the
study. This suggests that subjects were responding less to the expressive value
of the default than to their disposition toward the status quo.

Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
Our previous poetry and painting studies demonstrated significant valuation
gaps between creators and potential buyers in IP transactions. These valuation
gaps do not mean that IP transactions never occur; obviously, we see IP
bought, sold, and licensed in the real world every day. Our initial experiments
do suggest, however, that because the parties to such transactions might start
further apart than the neoclassical model would predict, they will be obliged to
spend more on negotiation to get to a deal. These higher transaction costs mean
fewer transactions, 114 and our results therefore raise the possibility that IP
markets might be less efficient than previously believed. These markets may
be clearing at a lower level of output - that is, with fewer valuable deals being
made - than they would be in the absence of endowment and creativity effects.
One limitation of our earlier experiments was that the expected payoff was
purely monetary. This differs from the real world in which the parties - and
especially the creators - may contemplate a number of possible monetary and
nonmonetary benefits of transacting. As noted above, there is considerable
evidence suggesting that creators value opportunities for attribution and
publication in addition to direct monetary compensation. 115 Perhaps, then, the
gap between creators' and buyers' valuations of IP might be substantially
reduced or even eliminated were the prospect of publication - and especially
publication with attribution - offered to the sellers/creators. These new
experiments are, in part, an attempt to improve the ecological validity 116 of our
previous research.

113

Thus, subjects in the Default Attribution condition were told: "Copyright law gives
you a waivable right to receive credit for your work. That means that you have the right to
insist upon receiving credit but that you can waive that right if you want to." Subjects in the
No Default Attribution condition were told: "Copyright law does not give you an automatic
right to receive credit for your work, but you may receive credit if you and the designer
agree to give you credit."
114
See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1107-10
(2000).
115
Buccafusco, supra note l, at 1152-53.
116
Marilynn B. Brewer, Research Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 3, 12 (Harry T. Reis &
Charles M. Judd eds., 2000) (defining ecological validity as "whether an effect has been
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In addition, and perhaps more importantly, our new experiments provide the
first quantitative measure of the monetary value that creators attach to
attribution and publication opportunities. Although a considerable body of
research has documented creators' desires for attribution, none of this work has
attempted to measure attribution's economic value. Our experiments provide
new data that can help shape the debate about the desirability of attribution
rights in the U.S. and abroad.
A.

Building upon the Previous Studies

The new data we have obtained from the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies
suggest that attribution opportunities may drive down creators' selling prices,
thereby dampening the magnitude of the creativity effect. Our new results
suggest that creators do attach some value to the prospect of publication with
attribution, and they reduce their WTA when presented with that prospect. But
our data also suggest that the prospect of publication with credit is no panacea
- while we saw statistically significant reductions in both our studies, subjects
in the Attribution condition in both studies persisted in reporting WTA
significantly above what the neoclassical model would predict. Although WTA
dropped substantially in the Attribution condition, the mean WTA numbers
were still $235 117 and $132 118 in the CPI/PDN and mTurk studies, respectively.
Given our findings from the previous experiments, it is unlikely that there
would have been many buyers willing to pay this much to obtain the creators'
chances of winning the prize. In those previous studies, buyers' WTP amounts
were usually closer to the rational expected value of the prize. 119 We would
expect that, had we recruited buyers for the current experiments, their WTP
would have roughly reflected the expected value of the prize, that is, $10 in
Experiments 1 and 2.
Interestingly, our data also suggest that the prospect of publication without
attribution has no significant effect in reducing creators' WTA and may even,
in some instances, increase it. 120 Scholars who commented on our previous
work had suggested that creators may value having their work "out there."
Perhaps these creators merely want to improve the world irrespective of
financial or reputational gain. They may feel a "warm glow" of pleasure
knowing that they have made a contribution to knowledge or the arts. 121 Some

demonstrated to occur under conditions that are typical for the population at large").
117 See supra Table 2.
11 8
See supra Table 1.
119
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 40 fig. I (reporting a mean
WTP for painting buyers of $17 .39 for a prize with a rational expected value of $1 0);
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 22 (reporting a mean WTP for poem
buyers of$10.38 in the "eyes closed" contest, $9.21 in the "eyes open" contest, and $5 .60 in
the lottery experiment for a prize with a rational expected value of $5).
120
See supra Table 1 and Figure 1.
121 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
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Wikipedia editors may feel this way.122 Our study, however, did not detect any
evidence of such an effect on creators' WTA.
Of course, we cannot say that our study proves that creators do not value
publication absent attribution. There is good reason to think that they do.123
Our failure to detect any effect on WTA by the prospect of publication may be
due to the group of subjects we used. Mere publication may have less value in
the field of photography than it does in the more networked and collective
environment of Wikipedia. Nonetheless, our data suggest that publication
without attribution may be viewed negatively by some creators, and perhaps
more negatively than no publication at all. To the extent that creators believe
they have a right to be credited for their work, they may dislike the idea of
having their work published without attribution.
Thus, at least in the markets for photographs that we have created,
attribution and publication do not play so strong a role in creators' utility
functions that creators are willing to entirely part with their works' economic
value to obtain them. While attribution seems to affect the amount of money
that creators are willing to accept to sell their IP rights, the diminution is small
relative to the overall magnitude of the creativity effect. Accordingly, while
bargaining over attribution might make markets for creative or innovative
goods less inefficient than we previously suggested, it does not appear to
produce a Coasean world of freely flowing goods in markets for IP. Initial
distributions of IP rights will still likely be sticky, and otherwise efficient
bargains will not be made due to creators' overvaluations.
B.

Evaluating Whether to Provide a Default Right ofAttribution

Even more than the supplement they provide to our previous research, our
new experiments are valuable for the light they shed on the emerging question
of whether and how to provide creators a right of attribution. U.S. copyright
law, which provides creators of a wide variety of artistic and literary works
with broad rights to control reproduction, distribution, modification, and the
public performance and display of their works, does not provide most creators
with any general right to attribution. 124 Our research provides quantitative
empirical evidence for the notion that creators significantly value attribution.
Scholars who contend that a right of attribution should be protected by U.S.
copyright law may claim support for their position in the value that creators
attach to attribution in our studies. Creators were potentially willing to
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON . J. 464, 464-65 (1990).
122
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 72-74 (2006) (contending that Wikipedia authors
derive pleasure from writing, and agree to abide by particular writing norms to participate in
a common publishing endeavor); Garon, supra note 23, at 99-100.
123
See Garon, supra note 23, at 100-02.
124
The exception to this rule includes the narrow rights granted under VARA. See supra
note 25.

2013)

WHAT'S A NAME WORTH?

1427

sacrifice a significant amount of cash in order to have their names attached to
their photographs if they won. As noted above, the estimated value that the
professional photographers attached to publication with attribution was
$415.07. 125 From this perspective, creators' statements about the desire for
attribution do not merely appear to be post hoc rationalizations of prior
behaviors or of community norms but rather explicit ex ante tradeoffs when
they have skin in the game.
As described above, scholars who support the provision of attribution rights
differ on the underlying reasons for doing so. 126 Some scholars believe that
creators deserve rights of attribution because of the moral connection between
authors and their works. 127 These scholars may find support in our research
because it provides quantitative evidence that creators do in fact care about
attribution. Nonetheless, economic considerations are typically not paramount
in moral-rights theories, so the specific tradeoffs that creators make between
attribution and money may be less relevant.
For those scholars who promote attribution rights from a utilitarian
perspective, the significant positive value that creators attach to attribution may
seem to support provision of such rights. 128 Yet it does not follow that the U.S.
should include a right to attribution in the law simply because creators value
it. 129 From a utilitarian perspective, attribution, just like any other aspect of IP
rights, should be assigned in such a way that it is likely to reduce transaction
costs and generate efficient bargains. 130 In light of the findings of our third
experiment, our research seems to undermine utilitarian arguments for creating
a waivable attribution right. 13 1

125

See supra text accompanying note 76.
See Tushnet, supra note 51, at 792-93.
127
See Kwa11, supra note 3 I, at 985-86; Tushnet, supra note 51, at 792-93 .
128
See Fromer, supra note 31 , at 1791 (citing this Article).
129
And indeed, the obverse is true: we may wish to include such a right in law even if
creators did not assign economic value to it. Some moral-rights theorists support an
attribution right on the grounds that it is ethically required as a matter of the creator's
relationship with her work. This is the moral value we discussed earlier. See Kwall, supra
note 31, at 986; supra text accompanying note 34. Our work does not distinguish any
potential component of moral value in measuring the overall value that creators assign to
attribution. Of course, for those viewing IP through an economic lens, the value that creators
place upon attribution - whatever its source - is due consideration in the enterprise of
structuring efficient property rules.
130
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at I 2-13 .
131
Jeanne Fromer has recently argued that creators may find attribution as an "expressive
incentive" motivating them to create more and better works. Fromer, supra note 31, at 179098. She suggests that because attribution may be relatively inexpensive for IP law to
provide, the creation of default attribution rights could reduce the law's reliance on more
expensive creation incentives like exclusionary rights. Id. This could in fact be the case. It is
unclear, however, whether creators actually do perform better when attribution is offered to
them ex ante or whether they simply value it ex post. Additiona11y, any benefits from such a
126
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Our previous studies suggested that large bargaining gaps are likely to exist
between creators and licensors of IP due to creators' systematic overvaluation
of their work. 132 These bargaining gaps create substantial transaction costs that
likely lead to inefficient markets and a suboptimal number of transactions. 133
The findings reported in this Article imply that creators are willing to
significantly decrease the amount of money they are willing to accept to
· license their work in exchange for attribution. Under the current copyright
regime in the U.S., creators who desire attribution must bargain for it - that is,
they will often have to lower their minimum WTA in order to receive
attribution. Accordingly, compared to a regime with a default attribution right,
the current U.S. copyright system probably results in more efficient (albeit
likely still far from perfectly efficient) bargaining.
The results of Experiment 3 bring this issue to light most clearly. All of the
experiments reported in this Article imply that creators attach significant value
to attribution, that is, they have fairly stable preferences to the effect that
attribution is valuable and that they are willing to trade off money to receive
attribution. Importantly, however, the specific amount at which creators value
attribution is deeply unstable and subject to significant framing effects based
on the default rule. When attribution is not provided as a default right but must
be purchased by creators, they lower their WTA by a modest but nonetheless
significant amount to purchase attribution. But when the initial entitlement is
reversed - that is, when attribution is made part of creators' default
complement of rights - creators are willing to part with their default attribution
rights only for substantial amounts of money. In our study, creators valued
attribution about four times more when attribution was provided as a default
than when it was not.13 4
In other words, an endowment effect - a significant gap between WTP and
WTA - appears to attach to the right of attribution when it is structured as a
default that creators must contemplate trading away. This is consistent with
much social scientific research on default rules and the status quo. Legal rights
that are structured as defaults are in a sense "owned," just like any other form
of property, and the owners of those default legal rights will tend to be resistant
to parting with them. They will demand more money to sell a right to
attribution than they would have been willing to pay to receive it.
When parties to IP transactions are bargaining over both use of the work and
the provision of attribution, we should expect fewer efficient transactions when
creators are given default attribution rights. Because creators value attribution

change would have to be weighed against the costs that we describe in this Article. For
purposes of this Article, we will assume that the kinds of tradeoffs between incentive
regimes Fromer describes will not happen and that the provision of a default attribution right
would not occur with a complementary diminution in other rights.
132
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 39-40.
133 Id. at 47.
134
See supra Part 11.C.3.
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more highly when the right is structured as a default entitlement, the initial
valuations of the parties to IP transactions will be forced further apart when a
right to attribution is structured as a waivable default held by the creator. Our
studies on the creativity effect indicated that significant bargaining gaps will
arise between creators and purchasers of IP and that these gaps will lead to
inefficient IP markets. 135 The results of the experiments reported in this Article
suggest that those bargaining gaps will grow substantially if attribution is
provided as a default entitlement. In a world where creators do not receive
attribution but desire it, they will tend to have to reduce the price of access to
their work in order to obtain attribution. By contrast, in a world where creators
receive attribution as a default, those who desire to use a creator's work
without attribution will have to overcome both the creativity effect and the
endowment effect that attaches to the attribution right. These considerations
suggest that we need to think carefully before changing U.S. law to incorporate
a default right to attribution.
To see how creators' asymmetric valuation of attribution may worsen
inefficiencies in IP licensing markets, consider an example where a car
company wishes to use a band's song in one of its commercials. The band
likely will attach significant worth to attribution, because it will likely value
the economic and moral dimensions of receiving credit for its work. The car
company may or may not consider the provision of attribution to be costly to
itself. Whatever the case, having a default rule providing attribution is likely to
impede efficient bargaining for the use of the song.
First consider the situation where the company does not attach any cost to
providing attribution. As our research on the creativity effect suggested, there
may initially be a significant gap between what the company is willing to pay
and what the band is willing to accept for the use of the song. Since the band
desires attribution, however, in a regime without a default attribution right, the
company can use the band's preference for attribution to negotiate a lower use
price. Experiments 1 and 2 in this Article indicate that the band may be willing
to reduce its WTA in order to receive credit. This will diminish the initial gap
between WTA and WTP and increase the likelihood that the parties will reach
an efficient bargain. 136
Now consider a situation where the company does attach a significant cost
to providing attribution, perhaps because it believes that including the
additional information on the commercial will distract viewers. Again, there
will likely be a gap between WTP and WTA. In a regime where there is no
default attribution right, the two parties will be able to negotiate over the
provision of attribution. Presumably, if the band does not receive credit, the
company will have to increase the amount that it is willing to pay the band, or

135

See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 52.
See Russell Korobkin, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?, 11 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 162, 196 (2009) (showing that the distance between parties' initial offers is inversely
correlated with the likelihood of successful bargaining).
136
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if the band receives credit, the band will have to decrease the amount that it is
willing to accept. In either case, there is a higher likelihood of the parties
reaching an agreement because they will be starting from closer initial
values. 137
The situation is different, however, in a regime where there is a default
attribution right and the user attaches a cost to providing attribution. Now, in
addition to the bargaining gap associated with the use price, there will also be
an increased bargaining gap in the price of attribution. As Experiment 3
suggests, the amount that the company would have to pay to avoid providing
attribution will be substantially higher than it will be under the no-default
attribution regime. Our data indicate that the band is likely to attach a
significantly higher value to attribution under the default attribution regime.
Thus, the parties will have to overcome significant bargaining gaps for both the
use rights and the attribution rights, thereby increasing transaction costs and
decreasing the likelihood ofreaching an agreement.
Accordingly, in our example, providing a default attribution right has two
negative effects on efficient bargaining. First, compared to a no-defaultattribution regime, the default-attribution regime sacrifices the benefit of
requiring the creator to bargain over attribution. This is a loss, because if that
negotiation occurred, it would likely drive down the creator's price and
increase the likelihood of an agreement. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, providing a default right to attribution will significantly increase
the amount that the creator values attribution and thus the amount that the user
will have to pay to avoid providing it. This will further undermine the chance
of reaching a mutually acceptable bargain. Recall that this increased value of
attribution does not likely reflect any exogenous value that the creator
experiences - the sort of value that the neoclassical model recognizes as the
basis for preferences. Instead, it is simply an artifact of the framing of
preferences subject to different default rules. There may be some who will
argue that the law should respect preferences no matter how they are produced.
We disagree with this view. Where preferences are constructed, at least in part,
by our choice of legal rules, they are within the law's power to shape, both in
fact and as a normative matter - at least if one choice of legal rule, and the
preferences that flow from it, will lead to more efficient outcomes.
In any event, providing attribution will often be costly. Indeed, some
creative industries - motion picture and software in particular - have objected
to an attribution requirement, arguing that providing attribution to the large
number of people who provide creative input to a movie or a software product
would be impractical and would interfere with private arrangements within the
industry that determine who is credited for creative work. 138 If these claims are
true, then reforming U.S. law to include a default right of attribution would
require licensors in a range of IP transactions to purchase creators' attribution
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rights. In this context, the transaction costs attending these deals would likely
increase.
These experiments indicate that, all else being equal, altering U.S. copyright
law to provide creators with default attribution rights can result in higher
transaction costs and less efficient transacting. Still, understanding whether the
shift from the current U.S. rule to a default rule in favor of creators' attribution
would be beneficial involves yet another layer of analysis. In a world of
significant transaction costs, the Coase Theorem advises us to avoid as many
costly transactions as possible by granting initial entitlements to those likely to
value them the most. 139 Our findings suggest, however, that this relatively
simple formula can in some instances lead to inefficient allocations.
If transaction costs created by overvaluation of a default right to attribution
- what we can refer to as "behavioral transaction costs," or "bias costs" outweigh the ordinary transaction costs recognized by the neoclassical model,
it may be best to keep U.S. law as it is. In such an instance, adding a default
right to attribution to U.S. IP law could on balance worsen, rather than reduce,
inefficiencies in IP licensing markets. On the other hand, if under most
circumstances ordinary transaction costs outweigh bias costs, then a switch to a
default attribution right would make sense.
In order to know which policy is preferable, more data on IP markets is
necessary. Over the run of IP transactions, how often are bias costs likely to
outweigh traditional transaction costs? And how often will the obverse be true?
These data are not yet available, and they might differ between industries. 140
For the moment, our findings suggest reason for caution given that scenarios in
which bias costs outweigh neoclassical transaction costs are far from
implausible. In Experiment 3, creators valued attribution four times higher
when it was given as a default compared to when it was not. Admittedly, these
laboratory findings do not necessarily reflect how large bias costs are likely to
be in the wide array of real-world IP transactions. Nonetheless, they do suggest
the existence of situations in which bias costs outweigh neoclassical
transaction costs, and where the more efficient default rule does not allocate
the initial entitlement to the party who values it most.
We wish to emphasize that our research does not definitively answer
questions about the value of providing attribution rights. Whether IP laws
should incorporate an attribution right is a complicated question mixing
economic and moral considerations, to which our data provide nothing close to
a full answer. They do, however, provide new insight into the economic value
of attribution. From an economic perspective, the law's decisions about such
matters should be the result of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the
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° For example, the amount at which creators value attribution may differ depending on
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right. While our data cannot fully describe these, they do point to some
previously overlooked costs of creating a default waivable attribution right.
Finally, our arguments apply to the prospect of adopting a waivable
attribution right. Recall, however, that some European countries have
established nonwaivable attribution rights. 141 In such a situation, the parties
cannot transact at all over whether attribution is provided. 142 Thus, in instances
where it costs something to the licensee to provide attribution, and where
transacting to waive it would leave both parties better off (that is, where the
cost to the publisher outweighs the benefit to the rightsholder), having a
nonwaivable right introduces an intractable inefficiency into the licensing
market. In such cases, we would expect deal prices to fall, although it is
difficult to say by how much. This situation would be difficult to model
experimentally, at least with a protocol like ours, because transacting over
attribution would not be possible by definition.
C.

Wider Implications for Property Theory and the Efficient Structuring of
Default Rules

Beyond questions associated with attribution rights and IP, this research has
important implications for a number of different substantive areas. Whenever
the law is confronted with a situation involving the efficient distribution of
entitlements, it will have to confront the issues raised by our findings on the
costs of defaults. Experiment 3 suggests that a party who enjoys a default legal
right as part of her initial complement of rights will tend to treat that legal right
in a fashion similar to any other form of initial entitlement and overvalue it
relative to what neoclassical theory would predict. That is, what the
endowment-effect literature suggests is true for property - that property is
valued more highly merely as a consequence of ownership - may be true also
for a wide class of other legal entitlements. Many legal entitlements including default contract rules, employment rules, and the availability of
certain kinds of remedies - may generate attachments and overvaluation in the
hands of their initial owners. In those cases, standard applications of law and
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economics theories will not result in efficient or welfare-maximizing
outcomes.
Our findings suggest two deep, even foundational, difficulties with the
Coase Theorem. One involves the appropriate distribution of entitlements in a
world without transaction costs and the other in a world in which transaction
costs exist. The Coase Theorem holds that in the absence of transaction costs,
it does not matter where the law locates initial entitlements: if the initial
distribution is inefficient, the parties will simply relocate it through a voluntary
transaction. For example, if the law gives an entitlement to A but B values it
more than A does, A and B will simply transfer the entitlement for some
amount of money between the two valuations.
Our findings suggest that the very act of locating an initial entitlement with
one party to a transaction may cause that party to overvalue that initial
entitlement. This means that the very enterprise of distributing initial
entitlements may inherently create transaction costs.143 That is, while the
Coase Theorem holds in the neoclassical world of exogeneity and stability of
preferences, in a world where preferences are endogenous and vary based on
the way initial ownership is structured, it breaks down. Parties face increased
transaction costs in negotiating, as we have explained. And that is true even
when the transaction at issue does not involve property but the transfer of a
right. 144 Coase employed such an example in The Problem of Social Cost, his
famous article setting out the Coase Theorem. 145 He based his discussion in
part on a nuisance case named Sturges v. Bridgman, where a noisy
confectioner and a quiet doctor were neighbors and went to court to see who
should have to move. Coase suggested that regardless of whether the judge
ruled that the confectioner had to stop using his machinery, or that the doctor
had to put up with it, they could strike a mutually beneficial bargain about who
moves, thus achieving an efficient outcome. 146 Nothing we have said suggests
that the parties in this case, or others, cannot strike mutually beneficial
bargains. But to think that they may ever be able to do so from a baseline of
zero transaction costs is implausible. If the very enterprise of distributing
entitlements causes transaction costs, then the baseline is by definition one
143
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where the parties face barriers to relocating it via negotiation. In such a world,
legal rules always matter. 147
Coase's great contribution was not, of course, to suggest that the world is
devoid of transaction costs. Rather, the real value of the article was to describe
how entitlements should be awarded when transaction costs exist. 148 According
to Coase, when transaction costs affect bargains, initial distributions of rights
may result in inefficiencies if those costs exceed the gains from trade. 149 Thus,
the law should typically provide the entitlement to the party who is likely to
value it most, thereby eliminating the necessity of transacting. This explains
why people are endowed with rights to bodily integrity, homeowners with
rights of quiet enjoyment, and authors and inventors IP rights.
The force of this insight erodes in the face of research indicating that
people' s preferences are unstable and are biased in favor of ownership.
Endowment effects will tend to make people attach greater value to things that
they own compared to things that they are considering purchasing. 150 We can
think of the gaps between WTA and WTP that arise due to ownership as "bias
costs." If bias costs significantly increase the minimum payment that the owner
of the default is willing to accept, purchasers of those rights might not be
willing to pay enough to obtain the rights although they would have obtained
them in the absence of bias costs. For that reason, in situations where bias costs
are (a) significant (so that they may outweigh traditional transaction costs) and
(b) asymmetric between the two parties to a transaction (that is, where one
party exhibits greater bias than the other), it might be valuable to initially
provide the right to the party that overvalues it the least.
Determining whether bias costs exceed transaction costs and how many
such cases exist is, of course, a difficult empirical question. But our research
suggests that the scenario is at least plausible. Accordingly, the law should not
unthinkingly follow the Coase Theorem's demands that entitlements always be
given to those who are likely to value them most. Doing so may, in fact,
increase inefficiency.
CONCLUSION

Scholars have often addressed the value that creators attach to publication
and attribution, yet little research has attempted to empirically test the
existence or magnitude of that value. These experiments have done so with
interesting and suggestive results. Our research indicates that creators do
assign significant value to attribution but limited if any value to publication on
its own. The amount that they value attribution, however, does not completely
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eradicate the valuation gaps and market inefficiencies that we have found
previously. Moreover, our research suggests that from a utilitarian perspective,
providing a default waivable attribution right may make matters worse.
Future research is needed to test the robustness of our findings. Moreover,
our experiments all focused on a single medium, photography, that typically
has low expectations of attribution. It is possible that in other media where
attribution is standard - for example, painting, literature, and music - the value
creators attach to it will be greater. It would also be worth comparing our
findings to situations, such as open source computer coding, in which the value
that creators attach to attribution results in free access to content.

